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The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 altered the
nature of European politics almost overnight. As Soviet and
then Russian political influence in Central and Eastern
Europe rapidly receded, the countries there were left to
direct their own political destinies and to develop their
own arrangements for state security. As Europe's premier
military organization, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) became interested in extending its
sphere of influence into this region by inviting some
Central and Eastern European states to join the Atlantic
Alliance.
Although NATO successfully added the countries of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to its membership in 1997,
there are still some who oppose NATO's expansion eastward.
This study examines the thesis as posited by George F.
Kennan that the expansion of NATO is the most fateful error
of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. The
arguments supporting NATO expansion include the potential
for increasing political stability and democratic reform in
Central and Eastern Europe, aiding NATO in its transition
from a strictly collective defense organization to a
cooperative security organization with broad European
security concerns including peacekeeping operations, and
perhaps most importantly, aiding in the transition of
Central and Eastern Europe into the greater European
community.
The arguments against the expansion of NATO include the
problem of antagonizing a politically unstable Russia, the
problem of consensus, and the problem of exclusion.
Following an analysis of both sides of the issue, the final
chapter includes a review of the study as well as
predictions for NATO's future role in European security. An
expanded membership contributes to NATO's metamorphosis into
an organization with broad European security concerns and
offers the best chance for unity in Europe.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Plan of Study

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe at
the end of the Second World War, another adversary
appeared out of the east to challenge the political and
military supremacy of the United States and Western
Europe.

Once an ally of Great Britain, France, and the

U.S., the Soviet Union emerged from the turmoil of the
Second World War as the greatest power in Asia and
Europe and, arguably, a world superpower second only to
the United States.^
When Germany surrendered on May 7th, 1945, the
Soviet Red Army occupied much of Eastern Europe
including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria,
Romania, Bulgaria, and roughly one third of Germany.“
With the large, battle-hardened Soviet army directly to
the east of them, many Western European nations became
nervous and suspicious about potential Soviet designs
1
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for a military invasion of Western Europe.
Responding to this perceived threat, on March 4,
1948, representatives from several Western European
countries met in Brussels to consider the development of
a mutual assistance pact designed for the military and
political protection of its members.

The result of this

meeting was the signature of the Brussels Treaty.^ This
treaty included Great Britain, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

In addition to pledging

the members to assist one another in the event of an
armed invasion of one of the member countries, the
Brussels Treaty also included a provision that the
member states would agree to "build up a common defense
system and to strengthen their economic and cultural
ties.
It soon became evident, however, that the Brussels
Treaty would be insufficient to deter effectively a
potential Soviet military threat.

The five signatories

realized that to guard against Soviet aggression, a
common defense treaty organization would necessarily
have to include a North American component--namely the
United States.

Talks about the inclusion of the United
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States and Canada into a possible European security
organization ultimately culminated in the signature of
the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949.^
Originally, the North Atlantic Treaty provided
f
little in the way of an organizational framework for
military operations.

The "organization" suffix became

more realistically applied as the member states of the
North Atlantic Treaty effectively rallied to carry on
the Berlin Airlift and field forces in the Korean War,
after which point the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) became
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NATO, as a military alliance originally formed to
deter the Soviet Union from expanding militarily and
politically into Western Europe has, on the whole, been
a resounding success.^

Indeed, NATO managed to "win"

the Cold War without ever firing a shot.

Shortly after

the creation of NATO and its subsequent expansion to
include the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet
Union and the "satellite" nations of Eastern Europe
formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). What soon
developed was a Cold War between rival alliances that
lasted until the Soviet collapse in 1991.

\
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From its creation until the end of the Cold War,
NATO succeeded in achieving its mission by preventing
Soviet expansion.

In considering the history of NATO's

creation, purpose, and recent political developments, it
becomes clear that with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, NATO has lost the impetus for its original
mandate--or its "raison d'etre."

Furthermore, many

argue that in developing a new mandate for NATO, the
organization should expand to include new member-states.
The impact that enlargement will have on NATO as
well as the European community is worth scholarly
consideration for two principal reasons.

First, as

Europe's premier selective defense organization, its
internal stability and cohesion can have important
positive or negative consequences for the security of
Europe.

Second, NATO's viability as an effective

selective defense organization— with which the issue of
enlargement seems inextricably intertwined--may also
prove to be vitally important to the progress of
democratic and capitalist reforms in the recently
independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
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It is the purpose of this study to test the thesis
posited by George F. Kennan that "NATO enlargement would
be the most fateful error in American policy in the
entire post-Cold War era."'
Critics of NATO enlargement cite several reasons
for their position.

One reason asserts that expansion

into Eastern Europe by admitting former Warsaw Treaty
Organization states serves to foment renewed distrust
between Russia and the NATO member-states.

Second, the

exclusion argument states that by admitting some Eastern
European states and not others, the political stability
of the region may potentially be damaged.

Third, by

increasing its membership, NATO may have a more
difficult time reaching consensus on courses of action.
Advocates of NATO expansion argue that adding new
members will help to stabilize the political environment
in Eastern Europe by helping to incorporate the newly
sovereign countries there into the larger European
community.

In this regard, enlargement provides these

states military security not necessarily afforded them
from other organizations such as the United Nations or
the European Union.

Furthermore, the proponents of this
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argument point out that NATO's credibility as an
international organization allows it to serve as an
effective peacekeeper as it moves from a strictly
selective defense organization to a cooperative security
organization.®
In order to explore the arguments surrounding the
issue of NATO enlargement, it will be necessary to
examine the historical, political, economic, and
military foundations for these arguments by examining
the mission of NATO leading up to, and following, the
end of the Cold War in 1991.

Furthermore this study

explores, through review of literature, the development
of new missions and future responsibilities for the
Alliance.
In examining the arguments for and against
enlargement, it is necessary to qualify the difference
between what is good for the Alliance, and what is good
for Europe and European security.

By asserting that

enlargement is preferable or not preferable, we may
assess the merits of the arguments based on their impact
on political, economic, and military factors, as well as
how these factors affect the Alliance versus greater
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Europe.
NATO's Theoretical Basis
Collective Security
Prior to the First World War, the international
community operated under a system known as the balance
of power system.

Under this system, nation states

formed short alliances during conflicts to preserve a
perceived balance of power among nations— in effect, to
preserve the status quo.

During the Napoleonic Wars in

the first years of the 19th century, French aggression
was perceived by most of Europe as a threat to the
balance of power among European states.

Consequently,

Great Britain and other nations banded together to
prevent France's domination of Europe.

From the

Napoleonic Wars to the First World War, the system
worked well and prevented any major outbreaks of war in
Europe.
However, by the end of the First World War, the
states of Europe recognized that the balance of power
system was no longer effective in preventing major
conflicts.

The result was the articulation of the idea

of collective security as represented by the creation of
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the League of Nations.

Collective security is designed

to prevent aggression through the threat of combined
action on the part of a community of nations.®
According to political scholar Inis Claude, the
designers of collective security envisioned a system
which;
...involved the establishment and operation of a
complex scheme of national commitments and
international mechanisms designed to prevent or
suppress aggression by any state against any
other state, by presenting to potential
aggressors the reliable promise of effective
collective measures, ranging from diplomatic
boycott through economic pressures to military
sanctions, to enforce the peace.
The proponents of collective security argued that the
problem was that the balance of power system fostered
the creation of competing military alliances that were
often unknown to states not party to the alliance.
Indeed, the First World War is frequently cited as an
example of the dangers of a balance of power system.
Forward-thinking political philosophers like Thomas
"Woodrow" Wilson and Immanuel Kant believed that a
system of collective security would best promote
peaceful coexistence among nations.

Although the League

eventually failed, the subsequent United Nations (UN)
8
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serves as a good example today of a collective security
organization.
The problem of establishing a peaceful interna
tional order in Europe has been present since the
breakdown of the feudal system and the emergence of the
modern Westphalian system of nation-states.^"

Although

the term "collective security" is an early twentieth
century invention, the central concept has been
advocated since the beginning of the modern state
system.

In the words of political observer Martin

Wight :
By collective security we mean a system in which
any breach of the peace is declared to be of
concern to all the participating states, and an
attack on one is taken as an attack on all. It
is amusing and at the same time sobering to
reflect that this system was written into the
Covenant of the League of Nations, and endlessly
discussed and refined for the next 15 years,
without any suspicion... or knowledge on the part
of Woodrow Wilson, or the League of Nations Union
that it had been tried repeatedly in
international history since the fifteenth
century.
Wight uses as examples of these early collective
security organizations the Most Holy League of Venice in
1454, the Treaty of London in 1518, the Association of
the Hague of 1681-83, and the Quadruple Alliance of
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1718.

The collective security system is founded in an

aspiration to think of interests beyond those of the
nation and its allies and to consider those of the
international society as a w h o l e T h e r e

is inherent

in the idea of collective security a sense of
involvement in the fate of others.

Author and

philosopher John Donne noted in Meditation XVII that,
...no man is an Island, entire of it self; every
man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the
main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe
is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as
well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine own
were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am
involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to
know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for
thee.
The characteristics of universality present in
collective security organizations have frequently made
them ineffective in dealing with political and military
conflicts.

Although political philosophers like Kant

believed that the only remedy for war and international
lawlessness was a system of international right founded
upon public laws conjoined with power to which every
state must submit, the most recent incarnations of
collective security such as the League of Nations and
the United Nations have often proven unreliable in
10
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dealing with regional security concerns.
Selective Security
While the United Nations serves as an excellent
forum within which member states may openly discuss
matters that are of concern to them, and although this
function does much to foster the advancement of peaceful
coexistence among nations, the United Nations has
historically been unable to deal effectively with many
regional security concerns.

The inability of the United

Nations to combat "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans
during the 1990s is evidence of collective security's
inadequacy as a framework for a military alliance.
As a result of collective security's frequent
ineffectiveness in preserving local and regional peace,
many nations have found it necessary to form security
organizations with a more regional, narrow scope, and
with limited membership.

Such international

arrangements represent what are known as selective
security organizations.

NATO is a manifestation of this

type of security organization.

Formed under the

auspices of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
which ensure the right of nations to create regional
11
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organizations for collective self-defense and the
regional resolution of disputes, NATO is essentially a
regional, selective security organization dedicated to
preserving peace in the North Atlantic region of the
world.
On a theoretical level, selective security
addresses one of the fundamental problems with the
practical application of collective security.

One

political scholar posited the problem of regional
conflict prevention as such:
...as long as the primary political units of
world society are nation states, determined to
protect their independence above all other values
except physical survival and run by leadership
groups accountable to domestic interests ahead of
world interests, no member nation of an
international collective security association
will participate in actions likely to put its
independence and domestic interests at risk
unless such participation is clearly required to
protect these interests.
In the more regionally-oriented selective security
organization, the focus is generally more narrowly
defined, and a common enemy is firmly designated.

While

a collective security organization is typically
dedicated to universal security for all, selective
security is dedicated to security only for its members.
12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Summary

As earlier noted, selective security organizations
such as NATO are frequently defined by the common enemy
against whom the member states are generally united
against.

With the collapse and disintegration of the

Soviet Union, the common enemy that had once unified the
NATO member states has disappeared-

NATO leaders are

now left with a dilemma--what should the new purpose of
NATO be, and should NATO admit new members to achieve
this goal?
For the purpose of answering the question posed
above, this paper is divided into four parts.

Chapter

Two is an historical summary which examines the roots of
distrust which developed between the United States and
Soviet Union long before the onset of the Cold War.
This account goes on to examine the events of the Second
World War that are relevant to the formation of two
opposing geopolitical camps following the end of the
war.

It is important to understand these forces as they

helped to create the political environment that gave
birth to selective security organizations like the
Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty
13
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Organization.

This part also includes an outline of the

organizational structure of NATO--as familiarity with it
is important to understanding many of the arguments both
for and against enlargement.
Chapter Three of this study articulates and
examines the arguments in favor of NATO enlargement.

As

the arguments in favor of NATO enlargement are numerous,
only the most prominent of them are examined here.

Such

arguments stress the importance of NATO as a successful
security organization and include the idea that NATO can
serve as a broader security framework for all of Europe
and, furthermore, that the states of Eastern Europe
would more rapidly be brought into the European
community through membership in NATO.
Chapter Four examines the arguments against NATO
expansion.

These arguments are largely based upon the

assumption that NATO's mandate will remain similar to
that which it has had for more than fifty years--solely
the defense of its member states from aggressive
neighbors.

The most prominent among the arguments

against NATO expansion is the Russian position on NATO
enlargement-

Just as the Soviet Union strenuously
14
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objected to the creation of NATO in 1949, Russia also
vehemently opposes enlargement— particularly the
inclusion of those nations of the former Warsaw Treaty
O r g a n i z a t i o n . By expanding to include nations like
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO creates
renewed animosity between historic rivals.

Furthermore,

the two issues of expansion at the cost of efficiency
and expansion at the cost of exclusion are similarly
addressed.
In the final chapter, this study speculates as to
the future of the North Atlantic Alliance as it
searches for a new role and strives to adapt to the
changes that enlargement is sure to have for it.

While

political observers may debate the pros and cons of
enlargement, it is fruitless to speculate seriously
about the future of an un-enlarged NATO--for enlargement
has happened and future enlargement seems a foregone
conclusion.

Therefore, addressing the arguments against

enlargement in this study is an exercise, to some
extent, in prediction.

As political observers

experience the world with a new and enlarged NATO, some
arguments contained herein may bear fruit, and others
15
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may not.

16
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Two Great Developing Nations

The history of NATO and the political forces that
gave it birth go farther back than the actual signature
of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

Specifically, a

cursory examination of the relationship between
Russian/Soviet and American histories offers a great
deal of insight into the development of the Cold War and
the subsequent creation of NATO and other selective
security organizations.

Perhaps the first person to

predict that conflict could one day develop between the
United States and Russia/Soviet Union was the French
political observer Alexis de Tocqueville.

As far back

as the early nineteenth century, de Tocqueville noted
the potential power and ideological differences
developing between the two nations.

As noted in his

classic examination of U.S. political culture, Democracy
in America, de Tocqueville states that,
19
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[there] are at the present time two great nations
in the world, which started from different
points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I
allude to the Russians and the Americans...
[their] starting-point is different, and their
courses are not the same; yet each of them seems
marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the
destinies of half the globe.^
In discussing the histories of the two nations, de
Tocqueville is brief, but he does point out several
important differences between the United States and
Russia.

One of the most interesting of these

differences is the manner in which the two countries
have related with foreign nations during their history.
While the people of the United States were
geographically isolated and free to pursue a "manifest
destiny" with great personal freedom and "rugged"
individualism, the Russian people were bordered by
numerous hostile nations and have been forced to develop
with a political solidarity and unity that enabled them
to defeat their numerous adversaries.
In fact, the Russian people have been invaded
during the last two hundred years by the French, the
Japanese, the Germans (twice), the British, and the
United States.

Much, of Russian and Soviet history is a
20
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history of warfare.^
The Formation of Two Can^s

As the First World War dragged on in 1917, as a
result of the Russian withdrawal, much of Kaiser Wilhelm
II's army was now diverted to the Western Front.

With

over one million new troops heading for France, the
Allies were in desperate need of military relief.

One

of the proposed solutions to this military dilemma was
the re-opening of the eastern front from which Russia
had withdrawn following the communist revolution and the
signing of the Brest-Litovsk pact with Germany.

This

pact turned over to Germany one quarter of Russia's
people, almost all of its arable land, and most of the
industrially rich areas of the country.^
The British, Americans, and French, fearing that
the new German troops from the eastern front might break
through the western line, resolved to involve themselves
in the Russian revolution on the side of the Tsar's
White armies.

In doing so, approximately 12,000

American troops in addition to British troops invaded
the area of North Russia around Archangel and Murmansk.
Fighting in this arena continued well past the armistice
21
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which ended the WW I, and into 1919 and 1920.
Ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to re-install
Tsar Nicholas II, the Western forces retreated and left
the Soviet Union in 1920.^
This little-talked about episode of American/
Russian history offers one historical reason why the
Soviet Union developed a distrust of the West by the end
of the Second World War.

When this 1918 invasion is

considered together with the French invasion in the
early 19th century and the hugely destructive invasion
by Germany in WWII, it becomes easier to understand why
the Soviet Union distrusted the nations of the West-particularly the United States.
In addition to Russia's turbulent history replete
with memories of invasion, events at the end of WWII
also contributed to feelings of distrust by the Soviet
Union toward the United States.

As described by

political revisionist historian Gar Alperovitz,
immediately after the death of U.S. President Franklin
Roosevelt, President Harry Truman learned of the
imminent testing of a nuclear device.

As WWII came to a

close, and the political fate of many Eastern European
22
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nations was to be decided at the Potsdam Conference,
President Truman assumed a less cooperative position
relative to the Soviet Union regarding issues of
political influence in Eastern European nations
following the war.^
As chronicled by Alperovitz, Truman was reluctant
to negotiate any arrangements until the atom bomb had
been tested, so that he might politically bully the
Soviets from a position of superior military strength.®
The conclusion that Alperovitz reached is that there
were political as well as military reasons for the use
of the atom bomb on Japan in concluding WW II.
Essentially, it was believed by the Soviets that the
United States, by using the bomb, endeavored to
intimidate them in order to gain greater influence at
the negotiating table when the political fates of
Eastern European nations were to be decided at the
Potsdam Conference-

For all the mentioned reasons, the

Soviet Union felt politically and militarily insecure
following WW 11.^
During the years between 1945 and 1949, faced with
the need for economic and political reconstruction as
23
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well as military protection, Western European countries
and their North American allies became concerned with
the expansionist capabilities and ambitions of the
Soviet Union.

Having fulfilled the purpose for which

they were intended, the armies of the Western European
powers were rapidly demobilized following the war.

When

it became apparent that the Soviet leadership had no
intention of reducing the size or scope of the Red Army,
Western European leaders became alarmed.®
Furthermore, given the nature of the Soviet
Communist Party ideology and its call for a global
revolution of the proletariat, it became clear that the
integrity of politically weak European nations— namely
those occupied by the Red Army in Eastern Europe— may be
compromised by an aggressive Soviet Union.

The

subsequent imposition of undemocratic forms of
government in many Eastern European countries added to
these fears.
One of the most visible factors that led to
political tension between the Soviet Union and the
United States was the conflict over Eastern Europe.®
The most important issue here was the fate of Poland,
24
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and indeed the Polish question dominated relations
between the Soviet Union and the western powers at the
beginning of 1945; Poland was far more important to both
sides than any other of the Eastern European countries.
It was the invasion of Poland that finally prompted
France and Great Britain to declare war on Germany in
1939.

Moreover, Poland formed the path by which Germany

invaded Russia and the Soviet Union in WW I and WW II.
Political hegemony in Eastern Europe was important to
the Soviets not only to provide a buffer zone between
themselves and the West, but also to serve as the
Soviets' own path to invade Germany should they again
have reason to fear German power.
The Soviet Union needed both the right of passage
through Poland as well as secure lines of communication.
If Poland were allowed to be independent, or even worse
come under the influence of the West, such rights could
not be secure.

By the start of 1945, the thrust of

Soviet policy seemed clear to the Western allies.

The

Soviet Union, in spite of vociferous objections from her
Western allies, recognized the communist-dominated
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Lublin Coiranittee as the provisional government of
Poland.
The Making of the NATO system

By 194 9 Europe was divided between East and West.
Each side had organized its part of Germany and had
incorporated it into its bloc.

This division of Europe

into two camps did not, however, lead to a stable
peace.

It was not enough for the two sides simply to

accept things as they were.

The Soviets, clearly

interested in the question of German power, believed
they had the right to take any measures necessary to
protect themselves, while the British and Americans felt
it necessary to retain some influence in Poland and
other Eastern European countries, as the Berlin Blockade
by the Soviets and the subsequent Berlin Airlift by
Western powers in 1948 amply demonstrate.
By 194 9, the balance of power shifted away from the
West when the Soviet Union successfully exploded an atom
bomb.

While the Soviets had long enjoyed a clear

superiority of ground forces in Europe, the Western
allies had been able to counterbalance this superiority
with their possession of nuclear weaponry.

With the
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breakup of the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly, the
Soviets were now in a much better position to accept a
political and even military showdown with the West/In fact, Stalin was quoted in October of 1950 as saying
that the United States, "was not prepared at the present
time for a big war."^-''

The general consensus in the

east was that if war is going to happen, let it happen
now.
The western powers were then faced with a serious
problem.

The military weaknesses now so obvious to

western military planners in the light of Soviet nuclear
technology led them to conclude that Western European
military buildup was necessary.

In short. Western

Europe would have to be defended on the ground, and a
military alliance would be necessary to accomplish such
a buildup.
The Structure of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) of April 1949-which is the legal and binding basis for the alliance-was created within the framework of Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent
right of independent states to individual or collective
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defense.

As the preamble to the Treaty states, the aim

of the Allies is to "promote peaceful and friendly
relations throughout the North Atlantic Area."^^
However, at the time of the Treaty's conception, the
immediate purpose of NATO was to deter the Soviet Union
from expanding militarily and politically into Western
Europe.
In order to understand the arguments surrounding
the question of NATO enlargement, it is important to
develop an understanding of how NATO operates.

The

principal decision-making and administrative bodies of
NATO include the North Atlantic Council, the integrated
military command structure, the secretary general, and
the various committees of NATO.
The North Atlantic Council
The North Atlantic Council is the only body within
the Alliance that derives its authority expressly from
the North Atlantic Treaty and is the highest decision
making body in the organization.

The Council, which

meets once a week in regular session, has effective
political authority within the organization and is
composed of representatives from each of the member
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States, known as Permanent Representatives.
The North Atlantic Council serves the important
role of providing a forum within which the NATO members
are able to express their concerns.

Permanent

Representatives act on instructions from their capitals,
and act to inform or explain the views and policies of
their governments to their colleagues around the council
table.

Conversely, the representatives report back to

their governments the views and opinions expressed by
other governments."*"

As NATO is an example of an

intergovernmental institution, each member retains full
sovereignty and responsibility for its own actions.
When decisions are made by the Council, consensus is
required for collective action; simple majorities
obtained through formal voting procedures are not used.
The Council, in addition to its duties as the prime
decision-making body of the alliance, has an important
public profile as it issues declarations and communiques
explaining NATO policy to the general public as well as
to the governments of countries which are not members of
NATO.
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The Secretary General
The Secretary General is a senior international
statesman nominated by the member governments as
Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense
Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group, and
as Secretary General and chief executive of NATO.

The

Secretary General is responsible for promoting and
directing the process of consultation and decision
making throughout the Alliance.

He has the authority to

propose topics for discussion and decision and possesses
a good measure of influence in settling disputes between
member states.
In addition to his position within the alliance,
the Secretary General is the principal spokesperson for
the Alliance in its external relations.
The Integrated Military Structure
The Integrated Military Structure provides the
means by which the member countries provide for their
common defense.

All nations opting to become members of

the military part of NATO contribute forces which
together constitute the integrated military structure of
the Alliance.

In accordance with Article 5 of the North
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Atlantic Treaty, the integrated military structure
provides the organizational framework which allows the
member countries to defend themselves against threats to
their security or stability.
Under the present arrangement, the forces within
the military command structure are organized into three
main categories: Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces,
Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces.

Each of

these categories is designed to combat specific types of
threats to NATO security.
In addition to the organization of military forces
on a function-basis, NATO military command structure is
further divided into two geography-based theatres of
operation: Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied
Command Atlantic (ACLANT).

The position of Supreme

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is located at the top
of the command hierarchy.

The SACEUR is responsible for

the security, peace, and territorial integrity of the
European member states.

In addition to these

responsibilities, the SACEUR is also spokesperson for
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
To this end, the SACEUR has direct access to the Chiefs
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of Defense and the Heads of Government of NATO member
countries.
Allied Command Europe (ACE) is charged with
safeguarding the area extending from the northern tip of
Norway to Southern Europe including the Mediterranean,
and from the Atlantic coastline in the west to the
distant eastern border of Turkey.

Responsible for the

security of over three million square miles and a
population in excess of 320 million people, ACE has
divided military operations into three categories
including Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) ,
responsible for Norway and the United Kingdom, Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), responsible for the area
south of AFNORTHWEST to the southern German border, and
Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), charged with
the security of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Mediterranean
Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Black Sea.

The

region of AFSOUTH is separated from AFCENT by the nonNATO member countries Switzerland and Austria.
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) is headquartered
in Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.A.

ACLANT extends from the

North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal
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waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa,
including Portugal, with the exception of the English
Channel which remains the purview of ACE.
NATO History from 1949 to Present

Between 1947 and 1949 a series of dramatic
political events brought matters to a head.

These

events included direct threats to the sovereignty of
Norway, Greece, Turkey, and other Western European
countries, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the
illegal blockade of Berlin which began in April of the
same year.

The signature of the Brussels Treaty of

March 1948 marked the determination of five Western
European countries--Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--to develop a common
defense system and to strengthen the ties between them
in a manner which would enable them to resist political,
military, and ideological threats to their security.
Negotiations with the United States and Canada
subsequently followed regarding the establishment of a
single North Atlantic Alliance based on security
commitments and mutual guarantees between the nations of
Western Europe and North America.

Denmark, Iceland,
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Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited by the Brussels
Treaty powers to become active participants in this
process.

These negotiations culminated in the signature

of the Treaty of Washington on April 4, 1949, bringing
into being a common security system based on a
partnership among the countries of the United States,
Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Iceland, and
P o r t u g a l . T h e s e twelve countries came to form the
"original" NATO.
the Treaty.

In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to

The Federal Republic of Germany joined the

Alliance in 1955, and in 1982, Spain also became a
member of NATO.
The North Atlantic Alliance was founded on the
basis of a Treaty between member states entered into
freely by each of them following open debate and
parliamentary process.

The Treaty upholds their

individual rights as well as their international
obligations in accordance with the Articles 51 through
54 of the United Nations Charter.
The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) commits each member
country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as
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well as the benefits of selective security.

The

greatest difficulty in negotiating the NAT was finding
an exact formula that would satisfy the European desire
for a U.S. commitment sufficient to deter Soviet
aggression, yet flexible enough to allow the United
States time to deliberate prior to entering any
conflict.

Eventually the agreement stated that,

[the] Parties agree that an armed attack against
one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all
and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of
the right of individual or collective selfdefense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with other Parties,
such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area
This was a revolutionary commitment from the United
States in view of its political traditions of
isolationism and avoidance of "entangling alliances"
during peacetime.
At this time, the North Atlantic Treaty was nothing
more than a document pledging mutual defense.

It took

the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June of 1950
to "put the 'O' in NATO— that is to persuade the Allies
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to organize an integrated military command structure in
peacetime and to establish the presumption of a large,
long-term U.S. military presence in Europe"^^
The invasion of South Korea had direct relevance
for Western forces in Europe as many Western states
believed the Korean invasion to be a Soviet stratagem.
Specifically, military advisors saw the communist
invasion of South Korea as a possible prelude to armed
invasion of Western Europe.
was swift and decisive.

The response by NAT powers

In December of 1950, General

Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had served as the Supreme
Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe in
1944-45, was appointed the first Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe (SACEUR).

In April 1951, Allied

Command Europe (ACE) became operational, with the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at
Roquencourt, near Paris.
The German Problem
The United States was, however, not satisfied with
bearing so much of the security burdens in Europe.
Specifically, the United States proposed that the
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) develop an
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independent military force capable of shouldering some
of the security burden.

Although West Germany had been

established as a state in 1949, it had only been given
conditional sovereignty and was still under an
occupational regime.
The U.S. proposal for West German armed forces met
some resistance.

The terrible memories of WW II had not

faded, and many within the Alliance were hesitant to
allow the rearmament of Germany.

Although the strategic

reasons for the creation of such a force were perfectly
logical given the potential for Soviet aggression in
Europe, the French sought to impose severe restrictions
on such forces through a counterproposal which called
for the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC).
As French leaders vowed never to accept "the creation of
German divisions," they instead proposed that German
forces be "organized into battalion units of about 1,000
men" to be distributed throughout the proposed European
army.

This proposal eventually faded away when an

alternate framework for the establishment of West German
forces was devised.
The French eventually lost their argument.
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In

1954, at meetings held in Paris, a series of agreements
was reached regarding the status of West Germany.
First, the agreements normalized relations between the
NATO allies and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or
West Germany).

Second, the occupational regime then

being imposed upon the FRG was officially terminated.
The Paris agreements also recognized the FRG as a fully
sovereign state, and finally, the FRG was invited to
join NATO as a full member.
In 1954, West Germany was admitted to the Western
European Union (WEU) together with Italy and the
original Brussels Treaty signatories.

West Germany

renounced the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons on its territory, and accepted various
restrictions on its conventional armaments.

With

assurances from the United States, Canada, and Britain
to maintain air and land forces in West Germany, France
finally agreed to West Germany's admittance into NATO
which finally occurred in 1955.
The Warsaw Treaty Organization
In response to the West German induction into NATO,
the Soviet Union signed the Warsaw Treaty in 1955,
38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

thereby creating the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).
The WTO included the Eastern European countries which
came to be known as Soviet "satellite" nations.

These

countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany (granted technical independence by the
Soviet Union in December, 1955), Hungary, Poland, and
Romania.

Although the WTO was a military alliance

directed toward the NATO member countries, the creation
of the WTO served to counterbalance NATO militarily and
politically.

A rough balance in European politics soon

emerged which would last until the Soviet collapse in
1991
The French Withdrawal
Responding to a dissatisfaction with U.S. nuclear
policy, and domination of the NATO military command
structure, French President Charles de Gaulle officially
withdrew French forces from the integrated military
command structure in 1956.

Moreover, the French

requested that all American nuclear weapons, NATO
installations and facilities, be removed from French
soil.

While the French remained a part of NATO in

virtually all other aspects, its withdrawal from the
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military command structure did have significant combat
readiness consequences.

For example, by removing NATO

installations from French soil, lines of communication
and supply were weakened, requiring that more resources
be moved farther east and closer to the front.

The

French withdrawal also had the effect of requiring more
support from the United States, and further required
that West Germany play a more significant role in NATO's
military readiness.
Detente
Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western
democracies relaxed during the Nixon administration.
During this time, many political observers were asking
questions similar to those that would come after the
Soviet collapse in 1991.

Specifically, many were

questioning the purpose of NATO during a period of
detente between the East and West.

In response to this

concern regarding NATO's future, the North Atlantic
Council commissioned a year-long study to examine the
future tasks of the Alliance which came to be known as
the Harmel report.
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The Harmel report provided for two essential
functions of the Alliance.

First, the Alliance was to

"maintain adequate military strength and political
solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of
pressure and to defend the territory of member countries
if aggression should o c c u r . F u r t h e r ,

the report also

created a new function which stated that NATO was "to
pursue the search for progress towards a more stable
relationship in which the underlying political issues
can be s o l v e d . B e c a u s e this report addressed issues
both of military preparedness as well as the political
gap between the East and the West, its adoption provided
the foundation of NATO's subsequent efforts in arms
control negotiations.
As arms control and reduction efforts realized
success, and the nuclear options available to NATO were
voluntarily reduced, NATO came to be increasingly
dependent upon conventional forces.

With the increasing

reliance on conventional forces, the strength of NATO
placed greater responsibility on the European member
states.
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The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has led NATO
to assume a somewhat different role in European
peacekeeping.^^

Specifically, the fall of communism was

perhaps nowhere more violent than in former Yugoslavia,
where NATO eventually became involved.
The Balkans and NATO as Peacekeeper
NATO's first major statement on the civil war in
Yugoslavia, in November 1991, gave no indication that
the conflict would lead to Operation Joint Endeavor,
which NATO defense Ministers in June 1996 called "the
largest and most complex operation NATO has ever
undertaken, a mission to help bring peace and stability
to Bosnia and Herzegovina,"^^

Originally, the NATO

countries expressed their "deep concern"^^ over the
bloody events unfolding there.

Over the course of time,

however, NATO determined that it must take a more active
role in the Balkans in order to preserve European
security.
It was not until the middle of 1992 that NATO began
to assume peacekeeping responsibilities in the former
Yugoslavia.

By the end of the same year, NATO in

cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU), was
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enforcing the UN economic sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro, as well as the general arms embargo against
the entire Yugoslav area.

This effort came to be

known as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) .
During the period between 1992 and 1995, the
Alliance made decisions that led to naval operations, in
cooperation with the WEU, to monitor and later to
enforce the UN embargo in the Adriatic.

NATO operations

there began with monitoring the UN no-fly zone over
Bosnia, as well as the ultimate implementation of air
strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo and other areas.
Summary

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created by
political and cultural forces that began well prior to
the end of the Second World War, has been a successful
selective security organization.

Throughout the intense

years of the Cold War during the 1950s and early 1960s,
the years of detente in the late 1960s and through the
1970s, and into the political turmoil associated with
Mikhail Gorbachevas policies of glasnost and
perestroika, NATO successfully provided for the security
of its member states.
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In assuming a new role of European peacekeeper, and
for a variety of reasons that this study later
discusses, NATO has determined that an increased
membership will best facilitate the achievement of
NATO's goals.

While NATO enlargement has already

happened with the 1997 admittance of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, and though further enlargement
seems a forgone conclusion, this policy of enlargement
has critics.

Although the Cold War is over and peace

seems to have arrived in most of Europe, NATO may be
creating new problems with which it must deal.
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CHAPTER III
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NATO EXPANSION

Most propositions for the enlargement of NATO find
legitimacy in the fact that NATO is a successful
international collective defense organization.^

Indeed,

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is widely
regarded as one of the most successful collective
defense organizations ever created.

As previously

discussed, NATO was established in 1949 for the purpose
of containing Soviet military and political expansion
into Western Europe.

Since that time and up to the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO successfully
served that purpose.
In discussing the arguments in favor of NATO
expansion several are seen as the most prominent.

It is

believed by many that enlargement of NATO to include
Eastern European nations will promote democratic reform
and stability there, provide stronger collective defense
and an improved ability to address new security
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concerns, improve relations among the Eastern and
Central European states, foster a more stable climate
for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and
finally, improve NATO's ability to operate as a
cooperative security organization with broad European
security concerns.

In short, proponents of NATO

expansion like former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright argue that, "the new NATO can do for Europe's
east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish
old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure
environment for prosperity, and deter violence.""

The

proposed duties of NATO listed above are important
because they would take care of problems which have
risen only recently and as a direct result of the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
As the Cold War ended, the political atmosphere of
Europe changed almost overnight.

As unpopular communist

regimes were swept away after four decades of Soviet
oppression, "[all] of Eastern Europe, millions
demonstrated their great joy and jubilation."’ With the
absence of Soviet hegemony, the fixed bi-polar
arrangement of political power shared by the Soviet
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Union and the United States was replaced by a very
unstable multi-polar political environment with many
separate nations each pursuing separate national
interests.

The importance of the Soviet collapse

relative to the political stability of Central and
Eastern Europe is not to be underestimated.^ With the
absence of Soviet power in the region, ethnic strife
once again resurfaced in these countries.'

While the

division of Czechoslovakia proceeded in a peaceful
manner, the breakup of Yugoslavia violently illustrates
one of the impacts that Soviet disintegration has had on
the region.

Similarly, the breakup of the Soviet Union

into separate republics had much the same effect.

In

many of the newly independent republics— particularly
the Baltic states--Russians now found themselves to be a
persecuted minority.^
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Soviet
disintegration can be found in the formulation of NATO
policy.

With the disappearance of its raison d'etre,

some argued that NATO was no longer necessary.

Others

argued that NATO should continue operating the way that
it had been since 1949, and still others believed that
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NATO might begin to assume new roles in the security of
Europe.

In developing new schemes for the security of

Europe, NATO leaders (particularly the Germans and the
Americans) eventually decided that enlarging NATO by
adding new member states offered the best possible
solution to the problem of a purpose for NATO, as well
as a solution to the problems of political turmoil being
experienced by the newly sovereign countries of Central
and Eastern Europe previously controlled like political
marionettes from the Kremlin.
Predictions of the demise of the North Atlantic
Alliance abounded in the years immediately following the
end of the Cold War.

Most academics inclined toward the

tenets of political realism were predicting that,
without the threat that led to its creation, NATO would
crumble and eventually wither away.^ While NATO's
future is still seen by some to be uncertain, it seems
safer to say that NATO will not continue to exist after
the Cold War in the same way that it did during the Cold
War.

Specifically, some believe that the Alliance will

become something more than a mere selective defense
organization.
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The logic of admitting new member states into NATO
finds basis in the fact that it is now assuming a very
different role than the one performed during the Cold
War.

Although the Alliance is still, at heart, a

selective defense organization, it is also transforming
into what is now being called an organization of
'^cooperative security".^

Specifically, political

observer Allen G. Sens argues that NATO is indeed
undergoing a transformation from a collective defense
organization to a cooperative security organization.
Collective defense efforts are typically formed to
"protect their members from a specific military threat
to their territorial sovereignty.

Such arrangements

are therefore exclusive, and are directed against
threats that are outside the membership of the alliance
With the absence of the Soviet threat, many believed
that NATO's collective defense arrangement might give
way to a return to the balance of power system in
Europe.

This scenario was considered by many to be a

political nightmare, as such a security system would
inevitably lead to a renationalization of defense
priorities among the countries of Europe.
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Since the Soviet collapse, NATO has been searching
for ways to fill this new role.

While the Alliance

seems to be far more than a collective defense
organization, it is also not quite a true collective
security organization.

Nor has NATO yet become the

basis for a new "concert of Europe."

According to

political scientist Allen G. Sens of the University of
British Columbia, the most apt description for NATO
seems to be that of a cooperative security organization.
While collective defense and collective security are
narrowly defined terms, cooperative security is broader
and more encompassing.
Cooperative Security

According to Sens, cooperative security is
described by six main points.

First, cooperative

security organizations are based on reassurance and
engagement, rather than deterrence and containment.

As

such they are inclusive and aim to incorporate likeminded nations into a larger political framework.
Second, the primary activities of cooperative security
are not directed against a specific external threat, but
rather exist for the achievement of shared security
52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

objectives.

Third, cooperative security is built on a

broad conception of security in order to promote
military and non-military objectives.

Fourth,

cooperative security is aimed at transforming and
adapting existing security arrangements to fit the needs
of the day.

Fifth, cooperative security prefers to

establish the conditions under which improvised,
informal, and flexible patterns of cooperation can
develop consistent with existing or traditional
modalities and sensibilities.

Last, cooperative

security recognizes the value and importance of other
bilateral or multilateral security arrangements in the
maintenance of regional security.
As Sens goes on to point out, NATO's actions since
the end of the Cold War indicate that it has in fact
come to exhibit many of the features of a cooperative
security organization.

According to Sens, NATO is "now

in the business of projecting security and stability
through an elaborate process of political engagement and
military cooperation with non-member states.
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The process of extending security and stability
began, for example, with the "hand of friendship"
extended to Central and Eastern European countries in
the London Declaration of June, 1990.

Furthermore, NATO

also announced in the Copenhagen Declaration a year
later that any coercion aimed at Central Europe would be
of direct and material concern to the Alliance.

At

the Rome Summit of November, 1991, NATO announced a new
strategic concept that no longer recognized the former
Warsaw Treaty countries as enemies, it de-emphasized the
importance of nuclear weaponry, and no longer spoke of
"threats" to security but rather of "risks" to
stability.

In short, this shift in NATO policy

represented an "explicit recognition by NATO of the
existence of a broadened security agenda.
With the assumption, by NATO, of this new role in
European security, many argue that the addition of new
member states enhances the organization's ability to
achieve its new goals.

Specifically, many believe

that NATO can be used as a tool to incorporate Eastern
European countries into the overall European community.
Furthermore, NATO could also be used as a military tool
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to maintain peace in the Balkans and other areas of
Europe.

Indeed, NATO^s interest in Central and Eastern

Europe following the end of the Cold War was undoubtedly
driven by a desire to extend stability into a
politically tumultuous region of Europe.^*"
According to many political observers, the best way
to encourage stability in East Europe is for NATO to act
as an exporter of Western European political values to
Eastern Europe.
Why Not Enlarge the EU Instead?

Many opponents of NATO enlargement propose that it
is not NATO that should be enlarged for the purpose of
greater European stability, but rather that the European
Union ought to serve this purpose.

Central Europeans do

not see the two organizations as alternatives, but as
complementary.

While some traditionally neutral nations

like Sweden, Finland, and Austria have chosen membership
in the EU, but opted out of NATO membership, most
Central and Eastern European nations see dual membership
in these organizations as perfectly logical given that
most of Europe considers NATO and the EU to be the main
institutions of Western security.

In short. Central and
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Eastern Europeans are unlikely to be satisfied with EU
membership alone.
According to Jane M.O. Sharp, three main reasons
account for Central and East European dissatisfaction
with EU membership by itself.

First, unlike the

European neutrals who have opted out of NATO membership,
especially Finland and Sweden, which undertake
substantial investments in military forces to make their
neutrality credible, none of the Central European
countries can afford similar investments.

Rather, these

countries recognize that they need to pool their
military resources to provide for a credible security
posture.
Second, Central Europeans find it difficult to see
the EU as providing "anything more than economic
security given the EU"s failure to mediate the crisis in
the former Yugoslavia in 1991-1992."^®

A third problem

seen by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is
that joining the EU means turning one's economic
structure and legal system upside down to become
compatible with other EU members.
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Moreover, Central and Eastern European nations also
point out that the standards for EU admittance are much
higher than those for NATO membership.

In addition to

the NATO requirements of democracy, rule of law, human
rights, and the protection of minorities within the
society, EU membership additionally requires a fully
functioning market economy able to withstand the market
forces present within the EU.

The EU also requires that

"its members adhere to the aims of political, economic,
and monetary union; and they must adjust their
administrative structures to make them compatible with
those of the other EU members.

Nations seeking NATO

membership instead of, or in addition to, EU membership
point out that even though the Swedes engaged in a rapid
program of EU compliance, it still took five years for
them to achieve full compliance.
Benefits for Eastern Europe

Many scholars assert that the enlargement of NATO
will help to promote democratic reform and peaceful
coexistence between the nations of Eastern and Central
Europe.

While there are certainly arguments that assert

the reverse which will be discussed in the subsequent
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chapter, many argue that NATO enlargement is likely to
ensure continued democratic reforms within the countries
seeking membership in the Alliance.

Because most every

nation of Eastern and Central Europe actively seeks
Alliance membership, the pursuit of the requirements for
NATO membership have very significant implications for
the European community as a whole.

If only a few

European countries were seeking membership NATO's impact
on the region would not be nearly so important.
When NATO admitted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic 1997, it did so because those countries had
achieved a certain level of political and military
achievement which corresponded with the prescribed NATO
standard.

Specifically, in order to be seriously

considered for membership, the applicant countries had
to achieve genuine pluralistic democracy, develop market
economies, as well as demonstrate a healthy respect for
the rule of l a w . W h i l e few would argue that such a
process will be trouble-free, it is nevertheless a goal
that Eastern European countries should strive for.
In attempting to be admitted to NATO, countries are
required by the Alliance to pursue democratic reforms.
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Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry laid out
a five point plan to which aspiring NATO members would
have to adhere in order to be considered for membership
in the Alliance.

Points four and five of his outline

said the following:
[potential] new members must uphold democracy and
free enterprise, respect human rights inside
their borders, and must respect sovereignty
outside their borders. Fifth, their military
forces must be under democratic, civilian
control.
In short, pursuing NATO membership has encouraged
many Central and Eastern European nations to put aside
their differences and work towards greater freedom
within their borders.

Specifically, some have

accelerated civilian controls over military forces;
others have peacefully settled long-standing disputes
over minority rights and borders.

In January of 1997,

the Czech government gave a formal expression of regret
for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia
in 1945 and 1946,

Similarly, over a number of years

Hungary and Romania transformed their relationship with
each other, as did Romania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser
extent, Hungary and Slovakia.
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Moreover, the Polish government sacked a general in
1997 who was unwilling to accept civilian control over
Polish military forces.

The Baltic states of Latvia and

Estonia, who have historically had problems dealing with
their Russian minorities have, in recent years, softened
their attitudes and policies toward them.
While many of these reforms have undoubtedly been
enacted in order to curry favor with the West, they are
nonetheless real advances for liberal democracy in these
countries.

Many of these countries, however, feel as

though Western governments keep moving the goal posts
farther and farther away from full membership in the
"Western club" by continuously raising standards.

It

then becomes incumbent upon the nations of the West to
offer some type of truly achievable goal as incentive
for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to
continue democratic reforms.
Benefits for NATO and the West

Aside from the benefits that democratization offers
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Sharp
asserts that stability in Eastern Europe helps to ensure
stability in Western Europe and other areas.
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Specifically, she points out that today, the nations of
Western Europe would never consider settling their
disputes via military means, and Western Europe has
consequently experienced political and military
prosperity since the end of WW II.

She further argues,

as do most statesmen and national leaders, that this is
the state of affairs that greater Europe should strive
to achieve.

As German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe put

it in October of 1993, "[if] we don't export stability
we shall import instability."^^

In the final analysis

... a wider alliance is but a means to the end of
building confidence and security toward which all
of NATO's directions are aimed. In an era of
profound transformation in transatlantic and
European security, there can be no guarantees
that the values and strategic outlook of the
Alliance can form the foundation for all of
Europe. Nevertheless, we do know that the NATO
experience has much to offer as we return to the
original broad ambition of NATO and embrace a
wider community of free peoples.^®
NATO enlargement may also prevent the
renationalization of military programs in the newly
sovereign nations of Central and Eastern Europe.
Renationalization is, in fact, something that concerns
both Central and Eastern Europe as well as Western
Europe and the United States.

Serbia's recent efforts
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to assert political hegemony over areas of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is just one example of this phenomenon.

If

NATO continues to expand to include new members in
Eastern Europe, it seems unlikely that these nations
would feel politically compelled to pursue their own
independent security arrangements.

According to

political analyst Jeffrey Simon in his article, "Does
Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," the denationalization of
defense policies has been one of NATO's greatest
successes.^'
Denationalization is the process whereby a
country's defense policy is openly shown to its allies,
thereby preventing insecurities from arising among
neighbors."^

Should NATO not enlarge to include new

member states in Central and Eastern Europe, or worse
still wither away into non-existence, many believe that
countries may re-nationalize their defense policies
resulting in the renewal of old suspicions,^®

The fears

of renationalization are particularly problematic to the
neighbors of the newly reunified Germany considering the
history of German military aggression.

Renationaliza

tion could also pose significant problems
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for relations between current Alliance members Greece
and Turkey given their historically tumultuous
relationship with one another.
In addition to preventing the renationalization of
defense policies of the member states of NATO, the
Alliance framework has provided an excellent means by
which the members themselves have peacefully settled
disputes.

In the British/Icelandic "cod-war" of the

1970s, it was NATO's general secretary Joseph Luns who
successfully mediated a resolution to the dispute.
Similarly, membership in NATO has nominally helped Spain
and Great Britain resolve their differences regarding
claims of sovereignty over Gibraltar.

Although these

political problems held great importance to the
countries involved, they pale in comparison to the
acrimony that has dominated relations between Greece and
Turkey for the last forty years.

Indeed, all-out war

has, on numerous occasions nearly erupted between these
two c o u n t r i e s W h i l e NATO has certainly done little
to address the sources of the strife between Greece and
Turkey, their membership in the Atlantic Alliance has at
least prevented full-blown war from breaking out between
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the two countries.
As events in the former Yugoslavia amply
demonstrate, there is great potential for serious
political and military turmoil in Central and East
Europe.

If NATO's success in preventing all-out war

between Greece and Turkey is any indication, it seems
likely that the incorporation of Central and East Europe
into the NATO family of member states can only improve
the political stability of the region.
The Russia Factor

While the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement has
generally been very negative as will be thoroughly
discussed in the following chapter, some believe that
NATO may again be called upon to act as a check upon an
expansionist Russia.

Specifically, although the Russian

reaction to NATO enlargement is generally cited as one
argument against the expansion of NATO eastward, some
believe that NATO ought to use this opportunity to gain
a stronger strategic advantage in Europe.

In short,

NATO should take full advantage of Russia's present
political weakness in order to ensure a stronger
position for NATO in the event that conflict again
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develops between Russia and the West.
Summary

In developing for itself a new role in European
security which some have called cooperative security,
NATO is transforming itself into something more than a
mere collective defense organization.

In assuming this

role, NATO has expressed its concern for the stability
of Central and Eastern Europe, and committed itself to a
strong involvement in the region.
For many political observers, NATO can best
encourage political stability in Central and Eastern
Europe by bringing these states into the NATO family.
As NATO looks forward to another fifty years, it seems
likely that it will continue to expand as it sees such
expansion to be the best bet for continued Western
European prosperity, continued political and economic
reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and the
development of a greater European security community.
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CHAPTER IV
ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATO EXPANSION

As Europe emerges from the political turmoil of the
Cold War, it is re-evaluating its established security
arrangements.

The most powerful and important of these

arrangements for the countries of Western and Central
Europe is arguably the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).

Pursuant to developing a new

security arrangement for Europe, NATO solicited
applications from European countries for NATO membership
beginning in the middle 1990s.

For a variety of

reasons, NATO member states believe that enlargement
through the addition of new member states is the best
possible way to achieve NATO's security objectives.^
The arguments against the enlargement of NATO are
equally numerous as those in favor of enlargement.
NATO's history as a premier selective defense
organization, according to many political observers, is
no justification to transform it into a larger, more
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United Nations-style international organization.

They

argue that to redefine the role of NATO to something of
this nature is to invite almost certain disaster.

As

George F. Kennan noted in a recent interview, "the
enlargement of NATO would be the most fateful error in
American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.""
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the major
arguments against the expansion of NATO.

In treating

this issue, we can see at least three major reasons that
support a non-expanded NATO: Russia will be antagonized,
exclusion of some countries in Eastern Europe may
destabilize instead of stabilize the region, and
finally/ the addition of new member states may prevent
NATO from taking the swift and decisive actions that
have, for more than fifty years, been largely
responsible for the successful security of its member
states.
The Russia Factor

From the end of the Second World War to its
collapse, the Soviet Union played a major role in the
politics of the countries of East and Central Europe.-
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Soviet/Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe began to end,
however, when Mikhail Gorbachev instituted his policies
of glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s, and officially
when the Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 31,
1991/

As this influence over Eastern Europe has

continued to disappear for the Russians, the West has
begun to extend its sphere of influence into this area.
When the West first began contemplating NATO
enlargement in 1993, Russia seemed likely not to pose
any serious objections, as it was mostly inward-looking
and pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy often dubbed
"Atlanticism"."
has changed.

Since this time, however, the situation

The Russian Republic has replaced

Atlanticism with "statism".

Statism is a policy whereby

the national interests of a state— in this case Russia—
are afforded greater importance than those interests of
the regional or world community.

This is a pragmatic

approach to foreign policy that relies on traditional
methods of diplomacy and mechanisms of power.
Evidence of this switch in policy orientations can
be seen most notably in the rhetoric of the Russian
leaders, the writings of security experts, and the daily
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conduct of Russian government in Eurasia, Europe, and
elsewhere.^ While this new policy does not necessarily
mean that Russia is again pursuing imperialistic
interests, it does mean that Russia is developing a
strategic identity and seeking to elevate itself to
regional power status.

In keeping with the theory of

political realism as posited by Hans J. Morgenthau,
former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said
that "a state is not rewarded for doing what is right,
only what is necessary to survive."^
The changes that statism has brought to the
expression of Russian foreign policy have roughly
manifested themselves in two political arenas.

In

Europe, Russia is pursuing greater reintegration with
western neighbors Belarus and Ukraine through the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)— very much like
an Eastern European Union.

In East and Central Europe,

Russia is vehemently opposing any enlargement of NATO
that would exclude it.

In short, Russia is endeavoring

to assert its influence in a politically neutral Eastern
Europe before it becomes too attached to the West.®

As

it seems likely that statism will remain a key feature
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of Russian policy for the near political future, further
NATO enlargement will undoubtedly cause further tension
between Russia and the West.
As Russia endeavors to create a stable regional
system by imprinting its authority in Eurasia and
East/Central Europe, its goals are likely to come into
conflict with those of the West.
Plagued by economic, political, and social turmoil
associated with the changeover from a communist to a
free-market capitalist state, Russia has become
politically weak in the international community, and it
feels that the West's efforts to enlarge NATO by
admitting former Soviet ally states is exploiting
Russian political weakness at the cost of Russian
security.®
Although NATO leaders assert that Russia has
nothing to fear from NATO enlargement, Russian leaders
continue to be c o n c e r n e d . N o issue is more central to
NATO's goal of building a peaceful political order in
Europe than relations with Russia.

The issue of NATO

enlargement is best examined from six distinct
perspectives.

These perspectives, which will be
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discussed later in the chapter following a broad
overview of the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement
include the following: the U.S. position of what
Russians should think about NATO enlargement, what
Russians profess about NATO enlargement, Russian
participation in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) ,
Russian views on the possible admittance of former
Soviet republics to NATO membership, Russian-NATO
deliberations about terms for future relations, and the
possibility of Russian membership in NATO.

In order to

understand fully these perspectives, however, it is
first necessary to review briefly the course of Russian
politics since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Since the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, Russia
has undergone intense political turmoil and has, at
certain times, assumed very different political faces.
An examination of these various political trends affords
political observers insight to understanding the issues
surrounding Russians reaction to the enlargement of
NATO.
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The Russian Response To NATO Enlargement

As the Warsaw Treaty Organization began to
disintegrate during the years of 1989 to 1991, many
Soviet officials believed that NATO, as well, would soon
fade away.

Eduard Shevardnadze, then the Soviet Foreign

Minister, declared in September of 1990 that, "in the
future NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization will
become component parts of all-European security
structures and later will probably be dissolved in
them."^"

Other officials went on to say similarly that

the U.S. military presence--and above all the nuclear
presence--would not remain long after the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.
This assumption by Soviet and later Russian leaders
has, however, been proven incorrect.

Although Soviet

troops were officially withdrawn from Germany by 1994,
the United States" military presence remains.

Soviet

assumptions regarding the demise of NATO seemed to have
been misplaced partly due to a false sense of WTO/NATO
parallelism.

In effect, they assumed that the WTO

equated NATO, and that without one, the other would
crumble.

The equation of the WTO with NATO proved to be
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a rather spurious one, as it grossly underestimated the
strength of the foundations of NATO.

While the WTO was

a creation of Soviet military and political influence
that was inspired in a

"top down" manner, NATO had been

created a full six years prior to the WTO, and done so
in a voluntary manner.

While the states of the WTO were

ostensibly forced into the organization and could not
get out

(with the exception of Albania in 1968), the

North Atlantic Treaty was a purely voluntary agreement
arrived at by fully sovereign states,
The failure of NATO to disintegrate as the Soviet
Alliance did in the early 1990s in itself caused much
consternation among Russian officials.

As is outlined

in the following section, the subsequent growth of NATO
as a successful international organization has created
significant political problems for the Russians, and for
the West, as they relate to Russia in the post-Cold War
world.
Atlanticism & Statism

Following the Soviet collapse and the breakup of
the empire in 1991, the new republic of Russia looked to
the West for economic and political assistance.
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To this

©nd/ Russian politicians assuin©d a vary accomniodating
political position relative to the West.

This political

and diplomatic position came to be known as
"Atlanticism."

Originally coined by Russian Foreign

Minister Andrei Kozerev, the term "Atlanticism" refers
to a two-part Russian foreign policy.

Essentially,

Atlanticism calls for Russia to do two things: work to
establish good relations with the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) , and second, to
pursue the establishment of good relations with the
West.
Kozyrev, and other likeminded Russian leaders
believed that only by forming close ties with the West
would Russia be able to overcome the imperial and
authoritarian legacy of tsarist Russia to truly become a
democratic and "westernized" country.

Only by joining

the West and becoming like the West, would Russia ever
be able to rise to a position of political influence
again.
Although Kozyrev's position did reflect a general
consensus regarding Russian policy, his views about an
Atlanticist foreign policy were not shared by everyone.
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Specifically, a growing number of Russian politicians
began to think in "more calculating t e r m s . V l a d i m i r
Lukin, then ambassador to the United States, represents
one member of a school of thinkers that began to place
Russian interests more directly above those of the
European or world community.

In 1992, Lukin published

an article in the U.S. journal Foreign Policy that
expressed a far more guarded Russian political/
diplomatic position.

In this article, he firmly

endorsed Russian cooperation with the United States and
West, but did so more for reasons based on political
realism than political idealism.
This shift in Russian policy represents the shift
from Atlanticism to a new kind of policy called
"statism."

The shift to a statist foreign policy

represented a major shift in the orientation of Russian
foreign policy.

Unlike the Atlanticist emphasis on

regional and international community concerns, statism
is far more concerned with the achievement of goals
which offer specific benefit to the state.

Statism

focuses on the internal integrity of the state.

This

type of policy judges international ventures based upon
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their benefit to the nation.

Looking outward, it seeks

a secure environment that will allow the state to live
safely and prosper; as such it often aspires to dominate
the areas near its borders and to exert influence even
farther out.
By 1993, it had become apparent that a potential
partnership between Russia and America would take a
backseat to the pursuit of separate, and at times
competing, interests.

The formal proclamation of this

new statist position came in Russian President Boris
Yeltsin's 1993 State of the Union speech to the Duma and
the Federation Council when he asserted that Russian
foreign policy would be based on the protection of
Russian national interest— even when that interest
competed with the West.

He further warned of a "Cold

Peace" if Russia's interests were trampled by the
West.
Russian Acquiescence
and the Permanent Joint Council

(PJC)

Pursuant to the new statist policy of "Russia
first," Russian leaders vehemently opposed the
enlargement of NATO to include the countries of the
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former Warsaw Treaty Organization.

While enlargement

became fact with the 1997 accession of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Russians did obtain what they felt to be significant
concessions from the West.
Specifically, the year 1997 saw the creation of the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

The Council

was officially established by the Founding Act, signed
by the NATO Allies and Russia on May 27, 1997, in
Paris.*®

Under the terms of the Act, the PJC brings

together representatives of the nineteen Allies and
Russia and provides a venue for consultation and
cooperation regarding political and security matters.
While Russian leader Boris Yeltsin claimed that the
Founding Act offered significant concessions by the
West, including a commitment not to allow former Soviet
republics into NATO, United States President Bill
Clinton claimed that the Founding Act and the creation
of the PJC have given Russia only a voice, and not a
vote.
The result of the Founding Act is ambiguous, as
both sides claim political victory.

Most political
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scholars believe that the Act simply means that the two
sides have agreed to disagree.
The Six Perspectives

As outlined earlier, the issue of NATO enlargement
and the Russian reaction to enlargement is perhaps best
examined from six distinct perspectives.

These

perspectives include the following: First, the U.S.
position of what Russians should think about NATO
enlargement, second, what Russians profess about NATO
enlargement, third, Russian participation in the
Partnership for Peace (PFP), fourth, Russian views on
the possible admittance of former Soviet republics to
NATO membership, fifth, Russian-NATO deliberations about
terms for future relations, and sixth, the possibility
of Russian membership in NATO.
First, the United States has argued that NATO
enlargement indeed serves Russian interests because it
serves to prolong U.S. involvement in European affairs—
thereby promoting the political stability of Eastern
Europe, and ensuring that Germany remains committed to
broader European security concerns instead of the
pursuit of a separate national agenda.

As former
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, ''Russia, no
less than the rest of us, needs stability and prosperity
in the center of Europe."^'
Albright and others have gone on to assert that
Russia should not view European freedom and security as
a zero-sum game in which,
Russia must lose if central Europe gains, and
central Europe must lose if Russia
gains...Russian opposition to NATO enlargement
is... a product of old misperceptions about NATO
and old ways of thinking about its former
satellites in central Europe. Instead of
changing our policies to accommodate Russia's
outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's
more modern aspirations.
Regardless of the problems associated with the Russian
response to NATO enlargement, U.S. officials have argued
that the Alliance cannot allow its growth to be
postponed or prevented by Russian opposition.

To do so

would give the message that confrontation with the West
pays off.
Second, while U.S. and Western European leaders do
much to emphasize NATO's role as a "whole European"
collective security organization, Russia has had much
difficulty reconciling with their perception of NATO as
a Cold War machine devoted to containment of Russian
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power.

To the Russians, enlargement is a policy

"pregnant with

d

i

s

a

s

t

e

r

.

Rather than viewing NATO

enlargement as a harmless process dedicated to promoting
stability throughout Europe, Russians continue to
believe that enlargement is deliberately taking
advantage of Russia's political weakness by extending
the Alliance's sphere of influence
U.S. involvement through NATO is also seen by many
Russians as proof that the United States is endeavoring
to "impose an American-designed European security
order.Furthermore,

the relegation of Russian troops

to de facto U.S. command in the Implementation Force
(IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former
Yugoslavia has been seen by many Russian military
leaders as demeaning and humiliating— particularly as
the United States has tended to favor the Muslim
Bosniaks over the Slavic Serbs.
Moreover, Russians believe the most obvious problem
with the enlargement of NATO is that it conveys a
continued distrust of Russia by the West.

As noted by

one Russian official.

82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

...[the] Russophobia openly expressed by the
Central and Eastern European leaders and the
implied promise to expand NATO membership in the
next round to countries bordering Russia strongly
suggest that advocates of enlargement have a
particular adversary in mind.
Such perceptions are particularly problematic
considering that the Alliance is essentially discussing
all matters of European security and is now unopposed in
implementing them.

As Vladimir Lukin asserted,

...[we] all want European security. But if we
are refused room [in NATO] we will have to worry
about our own security...politically speaking an
attempt is being made to kick Russia like a puppy
out of the door of a room where questions of allEuropean security for the strategic future are
being discussed. This kind of kick can trip you
up yourself."'"
Third, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) , originally
created in January 1994, offers NATO's partners the
opportunity of cooperating with NATO in various programs
and activities, including military exercises and civil
emergency relief, as well as military operations such as
IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia.

By the end of 1996, the PFP

had twenty-seven members including, but not limited to,
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland,
Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Russia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Moldova.
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Russia's initial reaction to the PFP was positive
when it was created in 1994, as the Russians believed
that its creation would replace any plans for NATO
enlargement.

Accordingly, Russia's participation in the

PFP was significant for the first year, particularly in
programs related to civil emergency planning.

Russian

participation soon faded though, when Russian leaders
came to perceive the PFP as a useless organization— that
it would not even serve the purpose of postponing or
preventing NATO enlargement.
Fourth, the most vehement objections voiced by
Russian officials about the enlargement of NATO have
been regarding the possible admittance of former Soviet
republics to the Alliance.

The Baltic republics of

Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as well as Ukraine, for
example, have expressed interest in becoming NATO
members.

While former Russian president Boris Yeltsin

believed that the signature of the Founding Act in 1997
included an indirect pledge by the United States not to
include any former Soviet republics in subsequent waves
of enlargement, Russians continue to doubt NATO
intentions regarding this issue.
84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While some contend that the Baltic republics of
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia might be added to the
Alliance without severe Russian discontent, others
believe that their admittance to NATO would cause
catastrophic feelings of humiliation and outrage within
Russia.

To understand the potential for this reaction

it is important to note how much Russia wishes to retain
a politically neutral "buffer zone."^”
^ Should NATO
choose to maintain an open-ended admission process, and
initiate moves to admit former Soviet republics into the
Alliance, many political observers warn that anti
western voices in Russia could come to power and move
Russia into a decidedly adversarial position relative to
Western interests.
Fifth, despite the enlargement that NATO has
ultimately undertaken. Alliance leaders have
nevertheless endeavored to remain sensitive to the
Russian desire to have input in decisions regarding
European security.

In 1996, for example, the North

Atlantic Council reiterated its "commitment to a strong,
stable, and enduring security partnership between NATO
and Russia.""^

Former U.S. Defense Secretary William
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Cohen noted that when important security issues about
Europe are being decided, it is important "to have
Russia in the loop, and not out of the loop."-'°
The United States and other Western leaders also
hope that NATO's continued efforts to include Russia in
European security decisions will help to convince them
of NATO's benign intentions.

One of the most overt

gestures to this end has been the reiteration by NATO
leaders that they do not intend to alter NATO's nuclear
deployment stance— specifically that they do not intend
to deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of newly added
NATO member states.
Sixth, one of the reasons for Russian opposition to
NATO enlargement has been the tacit understanding that
Russia is not being considered, by NATO, for Alliance
membership anytime in the near future.

It has, in fact,

remained an unresolved question.
Although the new mission for NATO as the panEuropean collective security organization does not, by
definition, preclude the possibility of Russian
admittance into NATO, the "Atlantic" nature of the
Alliance would require a major revision if Russia were
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admitted.

In the event of Russian admittance, NATO's

military and political responsibilities would extend all
the way to the Russian/Chinese border, and on to the
Pacific Ocean

something that the NATO member countries

may not be entirely willing to do.

Indeed, as former

U.S. Secretary of State and eminent political scholar
Henry Kissinger noted, "[no] European NATO country
considers Russia's size, territorial extent, and distant
non-European frontiers compatible with NATO
membership.
The European members of NATO generally consider
U.S. rhetoric that conceives of eventual Russian
membership in NATO unwise.

From the perspective of

these states, three arguments against Russian membership
stand out.
First, Russian membership may mean abandoning
NATO's role as an instrument of collective defense and
turning the Alliance into a very ineffective, and
cumbersome security regime for the entire Eurasian
region— not unlike a smaller, regionally-oriented United
Nations.

Second, Russian membership in NATO could upset

existing patterns of influence in the Alliance, and in
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fact could render the European NATO members subordinate
to a potential U.S.-Russia dyad of power.

Last, if NATO

retained its role as an instrument of collective
defense, Russian membership would make the Alliance
responsible for protecting Russia against China and
other powers.

Although the prospect of gaining Russia

as an ally against China is appealing to many U.S.
military strategists, such a pursuit is not of much
interest to the European members of NATO.
In short, potential Russian membership in NATO
offers some very interesting political dilemmas for both
Russia and the NATO member states.

While Russia would

most likely welcome an invitation to join NATO, the
Alliance seems unwilling to go so far at present.

As

Czech Republic president Vaclav Havel has said, "...an
enlarged NATO should consider Russia not an enemy, but a
partner...[but] Russia is nonetheless a Eurasian
superpower, so influential that it is hard to imagine it
could become an intrinsic part of NATO without flooding
the Alliance with the busy agenda of Russian
interests.
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Enlargement Perceived as a Russian Defeat

Irrespective of Russia's original and continuous
objections to NATO enlargement, political observers can
already see the damage that NATO enlargement has wreaked
on relations between Russia and the West.

Specifically,

enlargement has created four major problems for future
Russian political power in Europe and in the world.
First, enlargement has proven to be a disastrous
defeat for Russian diplomacy.

In spite of Russia's

protestations and advancement of an alternate security
organization called the Organization on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO has proceeded with
its plan for growth through the addition of new members.
Second, NATO enlargement symbolizes Russia's
sharply reduced influence in international affairs.

It

is the most visible sign of Russian decline, and
essentially confirms the fact that Russia's political
influence stops at the western Ukrainian border.
Third, enlargement signifies a defeat for Yeltsin's
policy of engagement with the West.

Originally seen as

Russia's path to salvation, good relations with the West
have not proven sufficiently fruitful in the eyes of
89

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Russian leaders.

Indeed, Russians see NATO enlargement

without their inclusion as a signal that they do not
belong in the Western world.

Such conceptions in Russia

also tend to undermine efforts at Western democratic
reforms.
Last, the growth

of NATO would seem to signify a

defeat for Yeltsin's policies vis-à-vis the near abroad
and Eastern Europe.

Following the breakup of the USSR,

many Russian leaders felt that Russia would serve as a
political and economic leader to the former WTO members
of Eastern Europe in much the same way the United States
interacts with Latin America.

When such a relationship

failed to develop, and Eastern European nations looked
west instead of east for political and economic
guidance, Russian pride suffered a severe blow.

The

last thing that anyone should want is a reawakening of
authoritarianism in Russia and the development of a
renewed adversarial relationship between the two
countries "marked out by the will of heaven to sway the
destinies of half the globe.
The Problems of Consensus and Exclusion

In addition to the significant problems surrounding
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Russia's reaction to the NATO enlargement, the addition
of new member states also poses potential dangers for
the cohesion of the Alliance itself.

Furthermore,

enlargement may also contain political risks for Central
and Eastern Europe.
Exclusion
While many advocates of NATO expansion assert that
the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe will help to
foster the success of democratic regimes and promote the
general political stability of the region, NATO
enlargement thus far has only included a few select
states in the region.

Specifically, in 1997, the

countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
were added to the NATO family.

While this inclusion

into NATO has undoubtedly allayed the security concerns
of these three countries, other countries in the region
have been excluded from the benefits of NATO membership.
Many political observers assert that NATO's success
in promoting stability in Eastern Europe will depend
greatly upon how the organization deals with and relates
to the countries that have been denied membership.
According to Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, two
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senior analysts at the RAND institute, how NATO handles
the states excluded from membership will directly affect
the stability of Europe.

The authors contend that, if

these countries feel "shut out, a destabilizing backlash
could materialize, undercutting support for reform and
strengthening nationalist forces within these
countries.
Asmus and Larrabee further contend that if NATO is
going to develop an attainable goal for European
security, the issue of excluded nations will have to be
sufficiently addressed.

Managing NATO's enlargement

process— particularly in defining the criteria so as to
justify the choice of new members, to prevent
destabilizing those not receiving invitâtions--is a
major challenge.

Perhaps the biggest fear of Central

and Eastern European countries is that they will also
not be invited to join the EU,
In short, how NATO and the West deals with the
countries excluded from the first round of expansion
will have a major impact on the political stability of
the region.
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Consensus
Although NATO seems, at present to be as
politically healthy as it has ever been, many scholars
believe that with the loss of its raison d'etre, NATO's
future effectiveness may not long endure.

Most scholars

agree that much of NATO's success is at least partially
attributable to the relative ease by which the memberstates reach consensus.

Specifically, it is pointed out

that fear of Soviet aggression on the part of Western
Europe ensured that NATO members were able to put aside
their minor differences in order to agree on "big
picture" issues
Just as the United Nations is widely regarded as an
organization too large to take quick and decisive
action--as was illustrated during the crises in the
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s— critics of NATO
enlargement contend that increasing the membership of
NATO only serves to increase the likelihood that NATO
will become too cumbersome to reach fast consensus and
take decisive action.
According to political observer Anton Bebler, the
decision-making capability of NATO could be seriously
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hampered by an increased membership particularly
considering the great political differences that exist
among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.^®
Summary

Clearly the most important argument against the
enlargement of NATO is the Russian reaction.

While some

argue that expansion now may provide NATO with an upper
hand in a potential future conflict, most agree that the
expansion of NATO without the actual inclusion of Russia
into the Alliance simply increases the likelihood that
such a conflict may, some day, occur.
Moreover, if NATO continues to expand, it risks
becoming too large to operate with speed and precision—
in short, it risks becoming a Euro-Atlantic United
Nations.

Last, while the inclusion of Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic has undoubtedly benefited these
countries, those left out of the first wave—
particularly Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic States
are left to deal alone with their own political
instability.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Review

As NATO emerges from the political tensions of the
Cold War, it seems clear that the organization faces new
and more far-reaching challenges for European security.
Created during a time of political distrust and
suspicion, NATO was very much a product of calculated
Cold War strategy.

To some, NATO is now a soldier

without a war to fight.
In Chapter Two this study examined some of the
potential historical reasons for the Cold War and
outlined the creation of and reason for NATO's
existence.

This chapter also examined the structure of

NATO with emphasis on the collective defense command
structure.

Chapters Three and Four have endeavored to

examine the political environment in which NATO now
finds itself as well the two main political paths that
NATO now faces.

While the expansion of NATO eastward is
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now a foregone conclusion with the admittance of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and future enlargement
seems certain,^ there are still arguments being made
that expansion is a bad political move for NATO and its
member states.
As this study has endeavored to demonstrate, NATO
enlargement has important consequences for European
security as well as European political stability.

As

Europe's principal defense organization, NATO's internal
stability and cohesion can have a significant impact on
the security of Europe.

Furthermore, NATO's continued

viability as a successful intergovernmental institution
seems likely to play a major role in the progress of
Central and Eastern European fledgling democracies.

The

arguments outlined in this study have all found basis in
enlargement's likely impact on NATO and on the security
of Europe.

While scholars on both sides of the

enlargement issue agree that the advancement of
democracy in Eastern Europe is a good thing, and that
the continued effectiveness of NATO is essential, they
still disagree on what effects enlargement is really
going to have on NATO and Europe.
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Arguments in Favor of Expansion
Perhaps the most prominent of the arguments in
favor of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is the by so doing, political stability
will be "exported" to Eastern Europe. As these
countries are only recently emerging from underneath the
thumb of Soviet domination, they are experiencing the
bittersweet pill of sovereign responsibility.
Specifically, countries like Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia are, compared to their Western European
neighbors, experiencing serious political instability
accompanied with rapid liberal democratic reform.

After

years of authoritarian rule, these countries are trying
to establish firm civilian control over the military,
protect the rights of minorities within their borders
(particularly in the Baltic states), ensure overall
respect for basic human rights, and, at the same time,
convert their economies to a competitive marketorientation.
In order for these countries to complete this
transition to true democracy, many believe that NATO
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needs to extend its umbrella of military and political
protection to these countries.

Moreover, it is

difficult to ignore the fact that political stability in
East and Central Europe helps to ensure continued peace
and security in Western Europe.

As German Defense

Minister Volker Ruhe asserted, "if we do not export
stability, we shall import instability.""
Furthermore, as NATO has served to prevent open
conflict from erupting between such rival countries as
Greece and Turkey, it is hoped that NATO can prevent the
nationalization of defense policies and resulting
military conflicts by expanding to include the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe.

As stated earlier, such

political analysts as Jane Sharp have pointed out that
today the nations of Western Europe do not even
"contemplate settling disputes between themselves by
force.""'

This is clearly a political reality that

Western Europe would like to see extended into Eastern
Europe.^
Last, as NATO transforms itself from a strictly
collective defense organization to a cooperative
security organization, enlargement becomes a more
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Arguments Against NATO Expansion
Perhaps the most prominent of the arguments against
the eastward expansion is the reaction it has elicited
from Russia.

Specifically, since the final days of

Mikhail Gorbachev through the administrations of Boris
Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, Russia has become more and
more averse to the prospect of continuing NATO (Western)
expansion into its former sphere of influence.
Although it seemed as though Russia would pursue a
very "West-friendly" Atlanticist foreign policy during
the first few years of the 1990s, by 1993, Russian
president Boris Yeltsin was warning of a "Cold Peace"
should the West continue to extend its sphere of
influence east at the possible expense of Russian
interests.

Although Russians are still dependent upon

Western foreign aid, they have made it clear that NATO's
continued pursuit of expansion may risk the relative
good relations that currently exist between themselves
and the West.
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The Russian resistance to NATO enlargement is
important for a couple of reasons.

One, NATO expansion

represents the failure of Russian policy vis-a-vis the
near abroad countries of Eastern and Central Europe—
namely those that have already been admitted into NATO.
Specifically, after the Soviet breakup, the Russians had
hoped to be the political leader of the former Warsaw
Treaty member states.

When this leadership role failed

to occur, it represented a severe blow to Russian pride.
Furthermore, NATO expansion eastward symbolizes the
fact that Russian political power really ends at the
eastern border of Ukraine.

As NATO and the West become

more politically important to Eastern and Central
Europe, Russia becomes less important politically.
These defeats for Russian policy have all contributed to
a Russian inferiority complex that some believe only
exacerbates political and economic instability.
By enlarging, NATO also runs the risk of becoming
too cumbersome.

While consensus was difficult enough to

achieve with the original twelve members and later
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sixteen members, the addition of three more members
could potentially cause the NATO member states to be
less able to agree with one another— particularly given
the absence of the external Soviet threat that helped to
hold the organization together for more than forty
years.
Last, if NATO is to expand eastward with the intent
of "exporting" stability through the encouragement of
democratic and free-market values, it must successfully
develop a plan for dealing with the states seeking
admission, but will not be admitted in the near future.
While many of these states are working to institute
democratic reforms in the hopes of being invited to join
NATO, if such an invitation is not forthcoming, reforms
may stall, resulting in further political problems.
NATO and the Future

Despite the provocative warning of George F. Kennan
that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of
American policy in the entire post-Cold War e r a , t h e
potential benefits of enlargement would seem to outweigh
the possible risks.

While the benefits of enlargement

should become apparent as the enlargement process
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continues and begins to really work, the risks
associated with enlargement can be dealt with through
careful planning and diplomatic discourse.

For example,

the basis for Russian opposition to NATO enlargement
rests with their exclusion from the Alliance.

Russian

fears of enlargement would undoubtedly be allayed if
only the member countries of NATO would hold out the
possibility of potential Russian membership.

This

strategy would seem also applicable to any of the other
Eastern European countries not currently being added to
NATO membership.

Although the problem of consensus is

still a valid argument against expansion, it would seem
to be a small price to pay for the possibility of
European military and political unity under the flag of
NATO.
Few would have predicted in 194 9 that NATO would
prove to be as successful as it has been.

Indeed, many

military analysts, including Dwight Eisenhower, believed
in 1949 that if American forces were still in Europe in
the mid 1950s helping to provide for its security, the
efforts of NATO would have been in vain.''

On numerous

occasions during its history, NATO experienced upheavals
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that many believed could have unraveled the Alliance.
Examples of these upheavals include the French
withdrawal from the joint military command in the 1960s,
as well as the Euro-missile crisis of the 1980s.^

When

the process of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe
began, "many analysts again raised the specter of
destabilization.
Despite these and other difficulties, however, NATO
has endured and grown strong. Although NATO was
originally constructed as a defensive military alliance
in the strictest sense of the term, it has continued to
survive despite the loss of its foe--contrary to the
predictions of those in the camp of political realism.
NATO's continued existence and growth in power, in fact,
suggest that a greater and deeper connection exists
between the member states.
Despite the warnings of such political scholars as
George F. Kennan and others, NATO enlargement seems to
offer many potential benefits for both itself as well as
Europe overall. While Russia has reacted very strongly
to NATO enlargement as it is currently conceived, Russia
seems less likely to be politically upset if membership
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within the Alliance were seen to be possible. Similarly,
the problem of exclusion only exists so long as some
countries are admitted while others are left outside the
organization with no hope of acceptance.
According the Charles Philippe David, if it is
supposed that the underpinnings of NATO's success extend
beyond military reasons, then the future for NATO
prosperity seems bright.

He offers the following

observation :
[first] existing members and aspiring members
alike want the benefit of belonging to the
hegemonic political camp. Second, the Alliance's
high level of institutionalization yields
benefits in terms of continental stability,
conflict prevention and management, and
coordination of national security policies.
These benefits go well beyond geopolitical
considerations. Lastly, NATO reflects the
existence of a community of nations which share
democratic values, practice consultation and
collective decision making, and wish to increase
the attraction of these values and
practices...[this] approach offers a more useful
perspective than realism not only on the
justification for NATO's survival and enlargement
but indeed on strengthening security in Europe.
For now, it seems likely that NATO will continue to
expand eastward as it attempts to promote stability
there, and achieve the development of a broader
framework for European security.

This study has
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endeavored to flesh out the arguments both for and
against enlargement not necessarily to prove that one
path is necessarily better than the other, but rather to
help promote understanding of the issues on both sides.
For example, even though Russia is currently opposed to
NATO expansion eastward, this position could change if
NATO were to consider seriously Russia for NATO
membership.^'

Indeed, most scholars agree that if NATO

is to survive in the long-term as an institution
spreading a "liberal vision" it cannot forever exclude
Russia.
The idea of a united Europe is not a new one.
While military conquerors like Charlemagne, Napoleon,
Hitler, and even Stalin envisioned a Europe united by
means of force and oppression, the potential unification
of Europe by peaceful, voluntary, and liberal means is
indeed a new idea, and is now a real possibility.

If

NATO^s success at unifying its members in a common
purpose to this point is any indication, and if NATO
continues its program of expansion to include Central
and Eastern Europe, the future for European peace and
unity is promising.
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